Is anarchy1 a realistic social organization? Based on its absence in the modern world one would be tempted to answer in the negative, at least for communities above the size of indigenous tribe (a few thousands, say.) Showing that complex and large-scale societies can function (or, even better, that they have already functioned) without a strong state and its inherent dangers would be a powerful argument in favor of attempting such a decentralized system in our time. This is exactly the argument that David Graeber and David Wengrow are trying to make in The Dawn of Everything: A New History of Humanity. Unfortunately, they are trying too hard. Below the fold, I'll give a synopsis of the first part of the book (chapters 1 to 6). A second post will summarize chapters 7-12 and a third one will conclude the review.
In Chapter 1, the authors lay out their case against the Rousseau/Hobbes alternative: prehistorical humans were neither intrinsically good nor inherently evil, and much more interesting than we (i.e. our current understanding of early humanity, as exemplified by a few popular authors: Fukuyama, Diamond, Pinker) give them credit for. In the process, they manage to work in a few recent events (e.g. the 2008 financial crisis and reactions to it, among the general public or the financial elites) and end the chapter by promising a new understanding of ancient history and (by implication) new insight into our current situation.
They start the work in Chapter 2, by rewriting the intellectual history of equality in the West, and trying to prove that it was strongly influenced by contacts with other cultures, in particular with the Native American tribes in the Great Lakes region. Their point of view is clearly stated:
'Social equality' -and, therefore, its opposite, inequality- simply did not exist as a concept.
until the seventeenth century, by their estimate. This sad state of affairs was improved by the contact with intellectually sophisticated and socially mature tribes such as the Wendat. Kandiaronk, a particularly brilliant member of the latter, introduced his revolutionary ideas on equality, freedom and rationality to the French colonists in a "proto-Enlightenment salon" (that's an exact quote). These ideas were then disseminated in Europe by a certain Lahontan in the early 1700s, they were adopted by the major French Enlightenment figures (Montesquieu, Voltaire, and later Rousseau) and the rest is history. A history, that is, shaped by a fundamental misunderstanding: Rousseau (and other culprits) fail to understand that individual liberty can coexist with a sense of community and sharing beyond the idyllic originary state. After the French Revolution, the right wing first repudiated Rousseau before adopting his 'myth of the stupid savage'.
'Social equality' -and, therefore, its opposite, inequality- simply did not exist as a concept.
until the seventeenth century, by their estimate. This sad state of affairs was improved by the contact with intellectually sophisticated and socially mature tribes such as the Wendat. Kandiaronk, a particularly brilliant member of the latter, introduced his revolutionary ideas on equality, freedom and rationality to the French colonists in a "proto-Enlightenment salon" (that's an exact quote). These ideas were then disseminated in Europe by a certain Lahontan in the early 1700s, they were adopted by the major French Enlightenment figures (Montesquieu, Voltaire, and later Rousseau) and the rest is history. A history, that is, shaped by a fundamental misunderstanding: Rousseau (and other culprits) fail to understand that individual liberty can coexist with a sense of community and sharing beyond the idyllic originary state. After the French Revolution, the right wing first repudiated Rousseau before adopting his 'myth of the stupid savage'.
Chapter 3 goes deeper into this concept of a primordial age, which should be carefully distinguished from our view of prehistory and from the actual state of affairs during the hundreds of millennia between the separation of humans from animals and the beginning of written history. There is very little information about social organization during this time, but based on the presumed physical diversity the authors conclude that:
social organization among our earliest ancestors [...is] likely to have been extraordinarily diverse.
so there was in fact no uniform originary state, and at any rate not one of small egalitarian bands, as shown by the existence of large (even monumental) constructions and by highly elaborate graves. The latter evidence would point towards a very large degree of inequality (since, after all, it would have been impossible to give sumptuous burials to all members of society). A large part of the chapter is thus spent using anthropological evidence on contemporary primitive society to argue for a prehistorical "sweet spot" between a highly hierarchical organization and no organization at all. One line of argument relies on the acceptance of "extreme" (in behavior or physical appearance) individuals and on the fact that most ceremonial graves hold difform individuals. This is used as proof against the existence of hereditary elites (although, on the face of it, it is an argument for them!)
A second observation concerns the seasonal variations in social organization: in some tribes authority only lasts for part of the year, opening the possibility that chiefs had little coercive power and ruled by shrewdly building consensus.
social organization among our earliest ancestors [...is] likely to have been extraordinarily diverse.
so there was in fact no uniform originary state, and at any rate not one of small egalitarian bands, as shown by the existence of large (even monumental) constructions and by highly elaborate graves. The latter evidence would point towards a very large degree of inequality (since, after all, it would have been impossible to give sumptuous burials to all members of society). A large part of the chapter is thus spent using anthropological evidence on contemporary primitive society to argue for a prehistorical "sweet spot" between a highly hierarchical organization and no organization at all. One line of argument relies on the acceptance of "extreme" (in behavior or physical appearance) individuals and on the fact that most ceremonial graves hold difform individuals. This is used as proof against the existence of hereditary elites (although, on the face of it, it is an argument for them!)
A second observation concerns the seasonal variations in social organization: in some tribes authority only lasts for part of the year, opening the possibility that chiefs had little coercive power and ruled by shrewdly building consensus.
Taking for granted the hypothesis that seasonal changes in structure were fundamental for the organization of prehistorical societies, in Chapter 4 the authors recast their basic question:
What is the origin of social inequality?
as "how did we get stuck in the authoritarian phase of the social cycle?" One element of response is the gradual reduction in the scale over which social interaction takes place [is this not simply sedentarization?]
The definition of egalitarianism depends on the important value in that society (which should be equally distributed). In modern European thinking, this would be material property and, per Rousseau, inequality followed the adoption of agriculture and lead to the rise of the state. Is this sequence of events inevitable? Here, Graeber and Wengrow once again shift focus, this time from equality to individual liberty, which in modern society is severely reduced, or at best reduced to formal freedoms.
Ancient monumental complexes such as Poverty Point (Louisiana) and others across the world show that farming is not a necessary condition: foraging peoples were capable of complex organization and of gathering enough resources to build such earthworks or to keep large standing armies or rich royal courts. The argument does hinge on a very specific definition of foragers: "populations which don't rely on biologically domesticated plants and animals as their primary sources of food".
Finally, all this discussion is supposed to reveal [but I have trouble finding the line of reasoning] a sacred origin of private property, still visible in contemporary primitive tribes and even (in trace form) in modern society.
What is the origin of social inequality?
as "how did we get stuck in the authoritarian phase of the social cycle?" One element of response is the gradual reduction in the scale over which social interaction takes place [is this not simply sedentarization?]
The definition of egalitarianism depends on the important value in that society (which should be equally distributed). In modern European thinking, this would be material property and, per Rousseau, inequality followed the adoption of agriculture and lead to the rise of the state. Is this sequence of events inevitable? Here, Graeber and Wengrow once again shift focus, this time from equality to individual liberty, which in modern society is severely reduced, or at best reduced to formal freedoms.
Ancient monumental complexes such as Poverty Point (Louisiana) and others across the world show that farming is not a necessary condition: foraging peoples were capable of complex organization and of gathering enough resources to build such earthworks or to keep large standing armies or rich royal courts. The argument does hinge on a very specific definition of foragers: "populations which don't rely on biologically domesticated plants and animals as their primary sources of food".
Finally, all this discussion is supposed to reveal [but I have trouble finding the line of reasoning] a sacred origin of private property, still visible in contemporary primitive tribes and even (in trace form) in modern society.
Chapter 5 tries to explain how such foraging societies in Northern California rejected agriculture, even as neighboring tribes were practicing it. Such an explanation is important for understanding the process of cultural differentiation. Following Marcel Mauss, the authors insist that civilizations define themselves to a large extent by contrast with their neighbors, whose culture they refuse. They return here to the concept of schismogenesis (already alluded to in Chapter 2) and apply it to the relation between northern Californian tribes and those on the Northwest Coast. Are the variations between these two types of societies due to economical or cultural factors or simply to the need of self-defining with respect to an Other?
Major differences are that the latter tribes were much more socially stratified (with a clearly delimited aristocracy) and practiced slavery on a fairly large scale. The two features are related, since the aristocracy needed a "dependable workforce", beyond what the free subjects were willing to contribute. Northern Californian populations would then have defined themselves in opposition with the above and adopted a frugal and egalitarian way of life.
The take-home message of the chapter seems to be twofold:
Major differences are that the latter tribes were much more socially stratified (with a clearly delimited aristocracy) and practiced slavery on a fairly large scale. The two features are related, since the aristocracy needed a "dependable workforce", beyond what the free subjects were willing to contribute. Northern Californian populations would then have defined themselves in opposition with the above and adopted a frugal and egalitarian way of life.
The take-home message of the chapter seems to be twofold:
- inequality "starts small", at the domestic level
- rather than being successive moments in history separated by an arbitrary threshold (such as the adoption of agriculture), egalitarian and hierarchic arrangements can be contemporary and influence each other in complex ways via the schismogenic tendencies of the populations that adopt them.
Chapter 6 uses the concept of schismogenesis to explain the difference between the highlands (e.g. Göbekli Tepe) and the lowlands (e.g. Çatalhöyük) of the Fertile Crescent. The latter were Neolithic farmers, but had a different relation with agriculture (and Nature in general) than modern humans: less clinical and forceful, more concrete and imaginative (invoking Lévi-Strauss and his The Savage Mind).
The authors try to resurrect the Neolithic matriarchy hypothesis of Marija Gimbutas and, in the case of Çatalhöyük, they argue for significant sequality between families and between sexes (with some feminine ascendance?) and for seasonal variations of social structure (as in Chapter 3) [this seems to derive from the seasonal character of farming and herding, but the claim is much stronger.] This society was more egalitarian and less violent than the highlands settlements (which probably relied less on farming), disproving the assumed causality relation between agriculture and inequality. Moreover, "the Agricultural Revolution" is not a very useful phrase for explaining the very long and complex process.
The authors try to resurrect the Neolithic matriarchy hypothesis of Marija Gimbutas and, in the case of Çatalhöyük, they argue for significant sequality between families and between sexes (with some feminine ascendance?) and for seasonal variations of social structure (as in Chapter 3) [this seems to derive from the seasonal character of farming and herding, but the claim is much stronger.] This society was more egalitarian and less violent than the highlands settlements (which probably relied less on farming), disproving the assumed causality relation between agriculture and inequality. Moreover, "the Agricultural Revolution" is not a very useful phrase for explaining the very long and complex process.
1 I am using this term in the broad sense of social organization without a central government. It also corresponds to Graeber's political sympathies, although Wengrow avoids it in interviews.↩
Dear Anonymous,
ReplyDeleteI deleted your comment because the second link is a) completely off-topic and b) of questionable value. I will not publicize this kind of position on my blog. You are of course welcome to resubmit your comment without that link.